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    Keynesian views eventually entered the mainstream as a result of the Keynesian- neoclassical synthesis developed by John Hicks. The rise of Keynesianism, and its incorporation into mainstream economics, reduced the appeal of heterodox schools. However, advocates of a more fundamental critique of orthodox economics formed a school of Post-Keynesian economics. More recent heterodox developments include evolutionary economics though this term is also used to describe institutional economics , feminist , Green economics , Post-autistic economics , and Thermoeconomics.

    Most heterodox views are critical of capitalism. The most notable exception is Austrian economics. Georgescu-Roegen reintroduced into economics, the concept of entropy from thermodynamics as distinguished from what, in his view, is the mechanistic foundation of neoclassical economics drawn from Newtonian physics and did foundational work which later developed into evolutionary economics.

    His work contributed significantly to thermoeconomics and to ecological economics. Notable schools or trends of thought in economics in the 20th century were as follows. These were advocated by well-defined groups of academics that became widely known:. In the late 20th century, areas of study that produced change in economic thinking were: risk-based rather than price-based models , imperfect economic actors, and treating economics as a biological science based on evolutionary norms rather than abstract exchange.

    The study of risk was influential, in viewing variations in price over time as more important than actual price. An important area of growth was the study of information and decision. Examples of this school included the work of Joseph Stiglitz. Problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard , both based around information economics, profoundly affected modern economic dilemmas like executive stock options , insurance markets, and Third-World debt relief. Finally, there were a series of economic ideas rooted in the conception of economics as a branch of biology, including the idea that energy relationships, rather than price relationships, determine economic structure.

    The use of fractal geometry to create economic models see Energy Economics. In its infancy the application of non-linear dynamics to economic theory, as well as the application of evolutionary psychology explored the processes of valuation and the persistence of non-equilibrium conditions.

    The most visible work was in the area of applying fractals to market analysis, particularly arbitrage see Complexity economics. Another infant branch of economics was neuroeconomics. The latter combines neuroscience , economics, and psychology to study how we make choices. Mainstream economics encompasses a wide but not unbounded range of views. Politically, most mainstream economists hold views ranging from laissez-faire to modern liberalism.

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    As this example suggests, a "mainstream" approach is defined by the degree to which it is adopted and advocated, not necessarily its technical rigor. Other viewpoints on economic issues from outside mainstrain economics include dependency theory and world systems theory in the study of international relations. Proposed radical reforms of the economic system originating outside mainstream economics include the participatory economics movement and binary economics. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. See also: Economic ideology. Index Outline Category.

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    Then hermeneutics could be understood as a teaching about a technical skill-but no longer Gadamer 19S1, p. The phenomenological hermeneutics proposed by Gadamer is "not at all a matter of a doctrine about technical skill that would state how understanding ought to be" , p. Understanding is more like "a process which happens to us" a, p. Second, for Gadamer, meaning is not a fixed thing, an actor's mental plan, waiting to be uncovered or interpreted. And, claims about "knowledge from within" are certainly apt to mislead Austrians into equating meaning with intention.

    Gadamer argues that "the reconstruction of what the author really had in mind is a limited undertaking. It is the seduction of historicism to see in this kind of reduction a scientific virtue and regard understanding as a kind ofreconstruction which in effect repeats the process of how the text came into being" , p. In short, there is no "ideal economist" parallel to Bakhtin's "ideal listener' who, free from presupposition, can really know the intention or plan of the actor.

    Third, hermeneutics is not simply a methodology for the human sciences. Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics disputes the claim of any methodological autonomy for the human sciences. This is not to say that the positivists or formalists have been right all along. On the contrary, Gadamer argues that the problem of understanding is "not just a problem proper to the methodology of the human sciences," rather it is "obviously part of the total human experience of the world" p.

    It is an ontological problem; it is an interpretation of being. Since the mids, Lachmann's students have defended the phenomenological hermeneutics inspired by Gadamer and Ricoeur, and Professor Lachmann certainly deserves credit for this or blame, depending on one's methodological stance. He has, indeed, encouraged some younger Austrians to follow a hermeneutical path. Lachmann may not have been fully aware, howevet, of the profound difference between his version of hermeneutics and that of Gadamer and Ricoeur.

    His students, therefore must choose between Lachmann and Gadamer. For, if my argument is correct, Lachmann's Weber-inspired hermeneutics cannot be reconciled with Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. I also share Vaughn's disappointment. Ludwig Lachmann and the lnterpretive Turn in Economics In the end We have agreed with Lachmann on all aspects of his description of the human condition, we have followed his criticism of the conventional orthodoxy and we have been eager to follow him in his examination of real markets, but we feel that we have taken a tour of individual trees and have missed the forest.

    Lachmann leaves us with detailed understanding of some market processes, but no overall theory of the market process itself , pp. Methodology influences theory; theory organizes the way we interpret the world. Considering the issues I raise in this paper, I am inclined to believe that Lachmann's methodology strongly limited his ability to theorize about the coordinating role of the market process, because it failed to provide a link between individuals and the overall social system.

    Lachmann rejected any claim that the market process systematically tends toward a general equilibrium. Under conditions of genuine uncertainty, some individuals will successfully accomplish their plans, but the plans of other individuals must fail. Lachmann thus suggested that the market process is kaleidic-it consists of an outright clashing of millions of separate, individual plans-and therefore there is no a priori way to claim that this process necessarily converges toward equilibrium.

    Hence Garrison's label of Lachmann as upholding an "equilibrium never" stance. It is certainly not my goal to rehash the equilibrium debate here. Lachmann's radical subjectivism sought-I think correctly-to acknowledge that "active minds" comprise the core of our study as Austrian economists. But Lachmann's proposal that hermeneutics be used as a method to focus on "The Plan" of individual actors is, following Gadamer's charge, historicist: it restricts our analysis to a feeble attempt to objectively uncover an individual's mental intentions. Although Lachmann occasionally mentioned the "intersubjective," his hermeneutics of the plan nevertheless fails, following Ricoeur's charge, to comprehend the social dimension of action: it provides little, any, if methodological basis to systematically investigate the way successful or unsuccessful plans have consequences that go beyond the intentions of individual actors.

    Those consequences may, in principle, tend towards enhanced coordination of economic activities. But, without that systematic link between the mind of the individual actor and its social consequences, it is impossible as Lachinann himself insisted , to claim that a decentralized, market process tends to generate a plan-coordinated equilibrium. Lachmann's notions of ignorance and genuine uncertainty surely played a key role in his rejection of equilibrium.

    In fact, Lachmann emphasized the whole "animal spirits" issue, which, understandably, encouraged his critics to focus on the role of ignorance and uncertainty in his theory of the market process. Lachmann's hermeneutical methodology itself formed a binding constraint: it failed tolink individual mental activity to spontaneous social order. I believe this explains why he lead us along a path tirat focused upon individual trees but overlooked the forest. Lachmann tended to downplay the issue of unintended consequences or, at best, he set it aside for future investigation.

    His students now lnherit the difficult task of analyzing the social consequences of human action and the principles by which they coordinate or discoordinate plans in general. This is clearly a responsibility of younger Austrians who promote a hermeneutical economics, and it may require, if my argument is correct, rejecting Lachmann,s own notion of hermeneutics. NOTES l. Lachmann saw the development of modern, general equilibrium theorv as a revival of late classical formalism and a reaction against full-fledged subjectivism.

    See, for example, Lachmann a and Lachmann believed Mises simply "consign[ed] expectations and uncertainty to Menger,s second category, the realm of the merely empirical, as distinct from the realm of necessary and essential. These phenomena may be interesting, but to Mises they were not interesting enough to engage his attention, which properly belonged to more fundamental matters', p.

    In , Lachmann turned to Shackle, rather than Mises, Hayek. Kirzner, or Rothbard, to define Austrian economics. Lachmann accepted Shackle's statement that "Economic theorv is about the sources of individual conduct and the consequences of its interaction. It is the intimate fusing together of the two questions, concerning the mode of choice of conduct and the outcome of the combination of many men's choices, that constitutes economics as a distinct bod1,.

    Also see Lachmann b. This means that even while men are gaining additional knowledge by learning from earlier mistakes, at the very same time some of their existing knowledge is continuously becoming obsolete We have to conclude that in a world inmotion lorces reducing the divergence of plans and other forces tending to widen such divergence will both be in operation, and that it is impossible to say which set of forces will prevail in any concrete situation Lachmann , pp.

    Also Lachmann S, pp. See Ebeling ; a; rb; I and Lavoie r; r; r They have, in rurn, influenced Boeuke a; b. Horwitz , prychitko 19g6; and Rector Ludwig Lachmann and the lnterpretive Turn in Economics phenomenological hermeneutics especially Gadamer's and Ricoeur's as it is to Lachmann. It is for this reason that t shall take the liberty to juxtapose Lachmann's understanding of hermeneutics to Gadamer's understanding.

    O'Driscoll and Rizzo's book is deeply indebted to Lachmann's notion of radical subjectivism. Lachmann did not, however, convince them on the hermeneutics issue. See Gordon , Rothbard ; ; , and Smith Frank Knight's nod to a verstehende Wissenschaft , p. Kenneth Boulding comes close to espousing hermeneutics for historians of economic though in his "After Samuelson, Who Needs Adam Smith? He does, however, reject Weber's concept of the ideal type as a "rather dubious method to interpret meaningful human action" , p. See also O'Driscoll and Rizzo's reformulation of the ideal type.

    Wilhelm Dilthey argued this point nearly a century ago: "No doubt the human studies have the advantage over the physical sciences because their subject is not merely an appearance given to the senses, a mere reflection in the mind of some ouier reality, but inner reality directly erperienced in all its complexity" The mere fact that this possibility exists is the foundation for the method of interpretation and thus offers a vindication of the plea for the methodological autonomy of the social sciences" , p. Developments and Prospects" , ch. Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate" See also Dilthey: "Understanding ranges from the apprehension of childish patter to understanding Hamlet or the Critique oJ Pure Reason The same human spirit speaks to us from stone, marble.

    This process of understanding must always have common characteristics because it is determined by common conditions and means olits own, and remains the same in its basic features" To accomplish this. As Paul Ricoeur explains. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them, to seek for an agreement, even ifthis agreement remains beyond our reach" , p What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author" Ricoeur , p.

    Steven Horwitz provides a nice application ol Gadamerian hermeneutics to shed more light on Menger's popular account ofthe evolution ofmoney as an unintended consequence of human action. I must admit, however, that I am becoming less convinced of the ontological claim that the market process is a "dialogic text" p. Prychitko b, pp. There have been recent attempts by Emilio Betti and E.

    Hirsch to resuscitate a Schleiermacher-type hermeneutics, one which seeks to discover an objective, final meaning oftexts, but they have faltered against phenomenological criticisms. See, for example. Madison Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian philosopher, was clear on this point: "Evenpcsl meanings. Bakhtin criticized the notion of an "ideal listener" who, free from prejudice or presupposition, is able to know the intention or plan of the author-actor, a criticism which seems appropriate to Lachmann: [T]he ideal listener is essentially a mirror image of the author who replicates him.

    He cannot introduce anything of his own, anything new, into the ideally understood work or into the ideally complete plan of the author. He is in the same time and space as the author or, rather, Iike rhe author he is outside time and space as in any abstract ideal formulation , and therefore he cannot be an-other or other for the author.

    Only mechanistic or mathematical, empty tautological abstractions are possible here. There is not a bit of personification , p. Gadamer argues that the notion of a definitive interpretation is self-contradictor-v. My argument vindicates the point, made by some of Lachmann's critics. For other critics, such as Gordon and Rothbard , this is largely coincidental. Given my understanding of their polemics, anything outside the Praxeologicai Method which purports apodictic certainty, etc. These critics would consider Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics to be no less nihiiistic.

    Madison states this point nicely for economists: "The object of economics may, like all the other human sciences, be meaning, but meaning is not reducible to subjective intentions. Meaning is always the meaning of human action, but, as Hayek himself strenuously insisted, it often is not the result of human design" , p. See Part 3 of Gadamer For a summary, see Weinsheimer , Ch. Ofcourse,Gadamer'sannouncementof"thehourofauniversalhermeneutics" ,p.

    The debate between Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas, which raged during the seventies and has spawned a whole genre of commentaries and interpretations among philosophers and methodologists, is exemplary. It seems to me that Gadamer has been more persuasive than Habermas, and has managed to convince earlier defenders of Habermas see Jay I , for instance.

    Be that as it may, Lachmann's call for a hermeneutics of the plan does not seem aware of this contemporary literature. My own stance on the equilibrium issue is found in Boettke, Horwitz and Prychitko and, especially, Prychitko a. Speech Genres and Other Late Essa ,s.