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By recalling the faces of the guests and their places at the table, Simonides achieved the insight that order and images were the key to a good memory The art of memory was widely known and practiced in antiquity and the medieval period, supplying an aid to individual memory in public speaking, poetry, and rhetoric.

Nikulin also insightfully explores memory's role in ancient poetry and history. For the Greeks in the archaic period, there was no concept of personal immortality, only the idea of fame kleos an idea picked up by Nietzsche and discussed in a later chapter. Fame could be transmitted through personal and cultural memory. In such a society, it was important not only to act properly but also to remember well the ethical imperative of memory is thus not a recent conception.


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Since an individual memory can fail, society needs a cultural mechanism of transmitting memory; for the Greeks this occurred through epic poetry and history The distinction between poetry and history, according to Aristotle, was between what could be and what actually happened, between the universal and the particular Finally, Nikulin analyzes the accounts of memory in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Roman rhetoric, and Plotinus. Because Plato's and Aristotle's concepts of memory and recollection in cognitive psychology establish the basis for the first three chapters and in some ways the whole book "Plato" is the single most-cited term in the index , Nikulin's contribution is especially valuable.

It was Plato who established the importance of remembering in philosophical thought, regarding it as the basis of knowledge. One recollects things one already knows, and this knowledge can be remembered through dialectics, the art of asking the right questions If Plato established the importance of memory, it was Aristotle who sought to explain how it worked, with most of his ideas set out in the De memoria et reminscentia.

Aristotle understood the mind as having faculties or capacities to perform tasks, with both imagination and memory having a role to play and both using images in their functions What was never completely clear was the exact nature of these images, which sometimes seemed like a sort of picture and other times more like a motion.

One of the issues that Aristotle left to posterity to determine was memory's relationship to thinking. Aristotle argued that memory was not thinking and that it belonged to the part of the soul that he called "primary sense perception. Philosophers would spend the next thousand years or so working out this relationship.

The succeeding chapters choose to highlight one or two of the three major themes. For Augustine sensible memories are not the product of the body but rather a product of the mind. One can have memories of things that one has not personally experienced, such as memories of the city of Alexandria.

For him, memory is not dependent on images but is actually present in the mind. His views are discussed by philosophers throughout the medieval period. The second line of philosophical influence on memory came through the Arab philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes, who began with Aristotle's De memoria et reminscentia and developed his ideas about memory.

For them, imagination received the contents from the common sense and retained them, while memory stored the intentions received by the estimation: "As for the intention, it is a thing which the soul perceives from the sensed object without its previously having been perceived by the external sense, just as the sheep perceives the intention of harm in the wolf, which causes it to fear the wolf and to flee from it" Averroes disliked estimation and thought it an unnecessary addition.

For him, memory perceives as well as stores. Memory is the most spiritual of the internal senses as each sense strips away some aspect of the image, taking away the husk and leaving the kernel, which is what memory gets. Where the difficulties came in for the Arabs as well as for many later thinkers was in the question of how memory interacted with the intellect. In Avicenna's system, the human soul cannot store previously acquired intellectual knowledge, so he distinguished between the possible intellect and the agent intellect.

The possible one is actualized i. The agent intellect came to be understood not as part of the soul but rather as a transcendent entity that functions like a universal transmitter for all individuals. The possible intellect receives intelligibles from this entity; it does not store them, but keeps a "knowing that" habitus that allows it to get better and faster every time it receives forms.

Like Avicenna, Averroes also denied that there is an intellectual memory. Albert understood Aristotle's ideas of recollection to be an intellectual process of a reasoned search, much like a syllogism. To elucidate Aristotle's thoughts, Albert turned to Cicero's discussions of the art of memory as the best example of a trained memory and an aid to reminiscence. After Albert, Aquinas developed the best synthesis of the theories available at the time. He rejected the agent intellect that even Albert had retained because he required a unified memory to fit with his anthropology of a union of mind and body.

Both Albert and Aquinas in their theories of recollection also saw a time dimension in memory that earlier theorists had ignored. For them, memory became a part of prudence and had an ethical dimension. He also sets up the problem of how memory works in intellection for the next chapter. His synopsis of ideas at the end of the chapter is the clearest depiction of these issues that I have encountered.

Leaving out a discussion of memoria as commemoration of the dead is a missed opportunity to connect with the themes of history and commemoration laid out in Nikulin's chapters and in the later contributions of the volume. Galpern has seen pre-Reformation Catholicism as "a cult of the living in service of the dead. One of the benefits of examining the broad sweep of conceptions of memory is that the big turning points emerge clearly. One such turning point occurred in the early modern period. Stephen Clucas's analysis in his chapter "Memory in the Renaissance and Early Modern Period" traces how the modification of Aristotle's faculty psychology, combined with changes in the art of memory, led to a search for the key to universal knowledge.

Instead he notes that the invention of printing actually deepened memorial culture, at least initially as a philosophical concept Humanist thinkers fastened on to the art of memory as a mechanism to perfect human mental powers, thinking that mnemonics ennobled memory. From the theory of places and images, order was singled out as the key and was incorporated by Ramus and Melanchthon into their own dialectic, a new kind of memory art that could help to link all of the arts together.

Ramus assumed that such a system would let one get at the underlying principles of the world and would better support memory because dialectics came not from an external order, as in the art of memory, but from an order innate to the things themselves The search for a logical way of ordering knowledge became part of the goal of pansophia or the encyclopedic project to unify all fields of knowledge.

It is at the end of this period, in Locke's theories, that one sees a transformation of memory. As philosophers lost their interest in mnemonics and its fundamental importance in the encyclopedic plans of the time, the concept of memory become fundamental to personal identity. Clucas argues that there was a "shift in the memory concept from one of knowledge acquisition to one of self-knowledge.

It is at this point that discussions of the art of memory disappear from consideration in the philosophic analysis of memory. This new understanding of memory as the key to personal identity was then explored in classical German philosophy. According to Angelica Nuzzo, in her chapter "Forms of Memory in Classical German Philosophy," with Kant's developmental of transcendental philosophy, memory goes from being a psychological faculty to the engine that grounds the structure of subjectivity As in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the recollecting function was seen as the higher faculty, and it became "the constitutive activity of consciousness.

It is also in this time period that the planks were laid for the development of ideas about collective memory. Some of the ideas contained in Chapters 1, 4, and 5 were originally put forward in substantially different and less satisfactory ways in parts of my The Metaphysics of Memory.

Sven Bernecker ftoc. The Concept of Memory 11 1. Personal Identity and Memory 46 2. Remembering without Knowing 65 3. In Defense of the Causal Theory of Memory 4. The Nature of Memory Causation 5. Pastist Externalism about Memory Content 6. In Defense of Pastist Externalism 7. The Authenticity of Memory 8. Authenticity 8. If one needs to be convinced of the significance of memory for our mental life, one only needs to ponder the fate of someone deprived of memory.

A first-hand account of what it is like to have memory deficit is given by the clinical psychologist Malcolm Meltzer who encountered memory problems as result of anoxia following a heart attack. When Meltzer came out of a six-week coma, he was moderately amnesic. He knew who he was, knew his job, and recognized his family, although not all his friends. His house was familiar but he could not remember where things were kept.

He had to relearn his age, how many children he had, how to play the stereo, how to set the alarm clock, etc. I had trouble keeping the facts in mind, which made it difficult to organize them. Often in talking with people I was acquainted with, I had trouble remembering their names or whether they were married or what our relationship had been in the past. Paradoxically, not being able to forget is almost as obstructive and debilitating as not being able to remember. A well-studied case of near perfect memory is Jill Price who, when given a date from the last 30 years, can instantly summon up the day of the week and can report what she did and how she felt Parker, Cahill, and McGaugh Her memory is non-stop, uncontrollable, and remarkable accurate.

Time that would otherwise be spent on other cognitive tasks such as acquiring new knowledge is devoted to retrieval. That is why Price tends to regard her superior memory as a curse. At any given moment, anything at all that someone said to me, or some hurtful or ridiculous thing that I said to someone that I desperately wish I could take back, may pop into my mind and yank me back to that difficult day and exactly how I was feeling about myself.

Since memory is a central component of the mind it is not surprising that thought about memory is as old as philosophy itself. But although discussion about memory has a long history, memory is a neglected topic in contemporary philosophy. When contemporary philosophers deal with the issue of memory at all, they confine themselves to discussing specific issues, such as the role of memory in epistemic justification, memory and personal identity, memory and the experience of time, collective memory, the hypothesis of extended memory, non- conceptual memory contents, and the ethics of memory.

It is this basic question that will be addressed here, if only regarding propositional or factual memory. The analysis of what memory is will focus on metaphysical and epistemological aspects. Prima facie, the identifying criterion of memory states is that they store objects with semantic properties content, reference, truth-conditions, truth-values, etc.

Yet a little thought reveals that storage of objects with semantic properties is not a unique feature of memories. Dispositional or ongoing beliefs also involve the storage of semantic objects cf. Field 80—4; Lycan 36—7, 56—7. When someone learns a particular fact, he acquires an occurrent belief that may be stored in memory and recalled when necessary.

And when the semantic object is retrieved from memory for active deployment in reasoning or planning, the subject once again has an occurrent belief. Thus, it should be possible to identify the features that memories have and other kinds of mental states such as beliefs lack. The book consists of eight chapters and a short conclusion. Chapters 1 to 3 set the stage by offering a tentative analysis of memory, by explaining the relation between memory and personal identity, and by distinguishing memory from both knowledge and belief. Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate and defend a naturalist version of the causal theory of memory.

Chapters 6 and 7 develop and motivate an externalist account of memory content. Chapter 8 proposes an account of memorial authenticity and Chapter 9 summarizes the discussion. In the remainder of this introduction I will briefly sketch what lies ahead. It is common among philosophers to distinguish between practical memory, propositional memory and experiential memory. Practical memory is remembering how to do something. Experiential memory is remembering from the first-person perspective an event one has personally experienced.

According to the proposed taxonomy, there are four main kinds of remembering. One can remember persons and things, properties, events, and facts and propositions. This study concentrates on propositional memory.


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  7. Sven Bernecker chap Propositional memory comes in different flavors. The content of introversive memory is necessarily in the first-person mode while the content of extroversive memory may be in the third-person mode e. These five conditions may be labeled, respectively, the present representation condition 1 , the past representation condition 2 , the truth-condition 3 , the content condition 4 , and the connection condition 5.

    This is not the final analysis but only a first approximation. The final analysis is stated in Chapter 9. Contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, I argue in Ch. Third, not any kind of cognitive attitude that stands in a memory- relation to another cognitive attitude qualifies as a memory state. For instance, an occurrent fear that p does not count as a memory—not even if it was previously formed and is now being retrieved from memory. This is the motivation for the past and the present representation condition. The truth-condition demands that one can only remember what is the case.

    The content condition ensures that the memory content is the same as, or sufficiently similar to, a content one has previously represented. By allowing that the contents of the past and the present representation are not the same but only sufficiently similar the content condition contradicts the identity theory of memory, that is, the thesis that for a propositional representation token at t2 to stand in a memory-relation to a propositional representation token at t1 , the contents of both tokens must be type-identical.

    Finally, the connection condition is meant to exclude relearning from the ranks of remembering and establish that the remembered representation is a retained representation. The idea is that a claim to remember something implies not merely that the subject represented it in the past, but that his current representation is in some way due to, that it comes about because of, his past representation.

    Whether memory presupposes personal identity depends crucially on whether the memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer. According to the proposed analysis of extroversive memory, when the memory content is in the first-person mode the bearer of the present representation must be the same person as the bearer of the past representation.

    Chapter 2 argues, however, that the dependence of memory on personal identity is of a contingent rather than a logical kind. The suggested analysis of propositional memory takes issue with the widely held epistemic theory of memory, that is, the view that to remember something is to know it, where this knowledge was previously acquired and preserved. Chapter 3 criticizes the epistemic theory of memory. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification. And so the question arises whether memory is merely a preservative source of justification and knowledge or whether it may also function as a generative source.

    Chapter 3 argues for what I call moderate generativism. Moderate generativism has it that, though memory is a generative source of justification, it cannot bring about new elements of justification. The only way for memory to function as a generative source of justification is by removing defeaters and thereby unleashing the justificatory potential that was already present at the time the belief was initially entertained.

    All of the elements required for a memory belief to be justified must already have been present when the belief was encoded. If the original belief had no justificatory potential because, say, it was gettierized, then memory cannot turn it into a justified belief. Memory generates justification only by lifting justificatory elements that were previously rebutted or undermined by defeating evidence. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the connection condition of memory. The connection condition states that, to remember a proposition, not only must it have been represented before, but the present repre- sentation must be suitably connected to the past representation.

    The memory content must not only correspond to, but must stand in an appropriate relationship to, the past representation. Without the connection condition remembering would be indistinguishable from relearning. The accounts of the memory connection proposed in the literature fall into three categories: the evidential retention theory, the simple retention theory, and the causal theory. Chapter 4 develops three arguments in favor of the causal theory of memory. First, unlike the evidential retention theory, the causal theory is not committed to the view that memory implies knowledge.

    Second, unlike the simple retention condition, the causal condition is neither too stringent nor too liberal. It is shown that the causal process connecting a past representation and its subse- quent recall involves intermediary memory traces or engrams. Between any two diachronic mental events that are causally related there must be a series of intermediary events, each of which causes the next, and each of which is temporally contiguous to the next.

    Memory traces account both for the propagation of mental contents through time and for the production of states of recall. Insofar as traces bring about states of recall they are intracerebral occurrences; insofar as they transmit mental content they are mental states. Depending on whether traces transmit conceptual or non-conceptual content they are dispositional beliefs or subdoxastic states.

    The trace condition simply expresses commitment to the theory of memory traces. Since we frequently re- member only after being given the appropriate prompt or retrieval cue there is the question of how to distinguish remembering something upon being prompted from merely repeating back the prompt itself. And the counterfactual condition demands that the causal chain connecting the present and past representation supports a counterfactual correlation.

    This condition is needed to eliminate cases of suggestibility from the ranks of memory. This condition gives rise to two questions. First, what does it mean for diachronic content tokens to be of the same type? Second, in what respect and to what extent may diachronic content tokens differ from one another and one of them still count as sufficiently similar to the other so as to be memory- related to it?

    Chapters 6 and 7 tackle the first question, Chapter 8 the second one. Chapter 6 proposes a content externalist account of the identity of diachronic content tokens and Chapter 7 defends this account against objections. Chapter 6 explains and motivates content externalism, sets it apart from environmentalism, defends it against internalist challenges, and applies it to memory contents.

    Given the dependence of memory contents on the environment and given that a person can move from one environment to another perhaps without even noticing the move , the question arises whether the content of an occurrent memory state is determined by the environment the person inhabited at the time he originally formed the representation pastist externalism , by the environment he inhabits at the time recollection takes place presentist externalism , or by the present environment and the environment s he will inhabit in the future, after recollection has taken place futurist externalism.

    Do memory contents and the concepts contained in them supervene on past, present, or future environmental conditions? The view argued for in Chapter 6 is that the content of a memory state is fixed by the environment the subject was in at the time he had the original representation. Once some content is stored in memory it is not affected by any subsequent environmental change. Pastist externalism in conjunction with other premisses has the consequence that an environmental change can bring about a conceptual shift which, in turn, can rob us of the ability to remember insofar as we lose the ability to entertain anew some of our past thought contents.

    Chapter 7 explains and defends the context-dependency of memory that follows from content externalism. In what respect and to what extent may diachronic content tokens differ from one another while still being memory-related? Chapter 8 argues that diachronic propositional attitude tokens are sufficiently similar for the token at t2 to be memory-related to the token at t1 only if the content of the token at t2 is entailed by the content of the token at t1.

    To illustrate the entailment thesis consider this example. Suppose at t1 you came to believe that Caesar was assassinated by Brutus.

    Philosophical notes & mnemonics (problem) - Homework, Test, and Study Help - Art of Memory Forum

    At t2 , all you can remember is that Caesar died of unnatural causes; you have forgotten the circumstances of his death. Notwithstanding the fact that Caesar was assassinated by Brutus and Caesar died of unnatural causes are different propositions, this may be a genuine instance of remembering, for the former proposition is entailed by the latter one.

    Granted that a memory content must only be similar to, not identical with, the content of the relevant past representation, one can remember a proposition one has not entertained before. The content of a memory state may be entertained for the first time at the time of recollection. This view contradicts the intuition that to remember something one must have thought of it before and that this is what distinguishes remembering from learning afresh.

    I agree with the platonic position according to which remembering anamnesis and learning afresh are compatible. Yet there are only few instances where learning afresh and remembering coincide. Learning afresh and remembering concur only when the memory content is entailed by something one has thought of previously content condition and when the memory state is suitably causally connected to the previous thought connection condition.

    Introversive memory involves a twofold classification. This raises the question of what are the criteria for the identity and similarity of diachronic attitude tokens. Chapter 8 argues that diachronic attitude tokens are the same if their functional roles are the same and they are similar if they share the direction of fit and polarity.

    Finally, chapter 9 summarizes the analysis of introversive and extroversive memory, respectively, and spells out its wider ramifications. There are many different kinds of memory but there is no generally agreed-upon classification of the kinds of memory. There is no periodic table of types of memory. Not only do philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists use different taxonomies, but also there are competing taxonomies within philosophy.

    Moreover, different philosophers take different kinds of memory to be the most significant, or for which analysis is most profitable. Section 1. When memories are divided up in terms of the length of time the information is stored, we get the distinction between short-term memory and long-term memory. Short-term memory stores information for mere seconds milliseconds in some cases. Long-term memory, as the name suggests, is the memory system that is responsible for storing information for such long periods of time that its limits are unknown.

    Memories are not only distinguished by the storage duration but also by the degree of awareness the subject has of the stored information. Psychologists classify memories as unconscious, dispositional, partially conscious, or conscious. A memory is unconscious if no direct awareness is even in principle possible. Any awareness regarding memory at this level is gained indirectly, by external observation or inferential reasoning. Dispositional memories are memories of which one is currently not aware but, were one given the appropriate retrieval cue, one would be able to recall them.

    A tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon is an instance of a partially conscious memory. Memories can also be classified by the kind of prompt that triggers the retrieval of the information. Psychologists distinguish between memories arising from explicit demands and memories arising from spontaneous triggers. Free recall occurs when the subject recalls information without any external information to help him.

    In the case of cued or prompted recall, subjects are given some explicit information which is not the same as the stored information to help them recall. The cues that trigger the recall can be either internal or external. In recognition, the subject is presented with a cue that bears a resemblance to the past experience or learned information and is asked whether he remembers it.

    Distinguishing kinds of memory by their content is, of course, the most common approach. The most basic distinction in psychology is that between memories that the subject can express declarative memory and memories that one can only demonstrate but not express non-declarative memory. Non-associative learning encompasses elementary forms of behavioral plasticity such as habituation and sensitization. In associative learning an unconditioned stimulus and a conditioned stimulus become linked so that a response normally triggered by the unconditioned stimulus is triggered by the conditioned stimulus.

    Following a suggestion by Endel Tulving , psychologists break down declarative memory into two subtypes: semantic and episodic memory. Semantic memory is the store of general knowledge about the world, concepts, rules, and language. The characteristic feature of semantic memory is that it can be used without reference to the events that account for its formation in the first place. Episodic memory, on the other hand, is accompanied by the experience of remembering, or mentally traveling back in time and re-experiencing the events.

    Thus, whereas semantic memory involves retrieval of the information acquired during a given learning episode, episodic memory involves, in addition, remembering something about the specific learning episode itself, namely the context in which the information was acquired. Larry Squire and Eric Kandel n. In recalling this type of information, and animal or human subject need not remember any particular past event. Episodic memory, unlike semantic memory, stored spatial and temporal land- marks that identify the particular time and place when an event occurred.

    Both episodic and semantic memory are declarative. Information is retrieved consciously and subjects are aware that they are accessing stored information. When philosophers distinguish kinds of memory by their con- tent they usually come up with a tripartite classification: experiential or personal , propositional or factual , and practical or procedural memory.

    First, one can experientially remember only what one has personally experienced. Ex- periential memory is restricted to cases in which the claim to remember something incorporates the claim to have experienced it for oneself. He distinguishes between experiential memory, substantive content memory, and purely preservative memory.

    Experiential memory consists in representations of a particular thing, event, property instance, experience, state, or act and requires previous direct perception or experience of the particular thing. Purely preservative memory consists in the retention of representational content for future use. Unlike the experiential memory and substantive content memory, purely preservative memory does not introduce new subject matter into current thinking.

    Experiential memory consists in the evocation of parts of the original experience in imagination, allowing to relive or re-experience the original situation and going over what it was like. Martin and Max Deutscher —3 write: If someone is asked whether he remembers what he did last Friday at lunchtime, he may be able to say that he went down the street. Yet he may feel scarcely in a position to say that he remembers actually going down the street. What he needs in order to be able to say that he does [experientially] remember going down the street is at least more detailed remembering that.

    To experientially remember something one must not only remember what happened but also remember what it was like. Wollheim describes this fact about iconic mental states by appealing to an analogy with theater. The three theatrical roles of director, actor, and audience have their analogues in iconic mental states. Hughes Like practical and experiential memory, propositional memory is truth-entailing.

    As Norman Malcolm ibid. One can remember true propositions about the past e. One cannot remember that p if one has only just learned that p. Unlike experiential memory, propositional memory is not limited to things with which one has had direct or personal acquaintance. One need not have witnessed the event to remember, say, that Brutus stabbed Caesar. And provided the individual is the final authority on the existence and nature of his mental images and qualia, self-ascriptions of experiential memory have an epistemic authority that self-ascriptions of propositional memory lack.

    Malcolm ibid. Neither of the features apply to practical memory, which is remembering how to do something, where this refers to previously acquired and retained skills. Examples of practical memory are remem- bering how to swim and remembering how to ride a bicycle. It is customary to distinguish between occurrent and dispositional practical memory.

    The distinction between propositional memory and experiential memory is not sharp. Consider my remembering that last summer I spent a few days in Rome. Is it a piece of experiential memory or does it belong to the class of propositional memory? To answer this question, proponents of the tripartite taxonomy will presumably enquire whether the content of the memory consists merely of a proposition or whether it also includes imagery and qualia.

    But the problem with this strategy is that the frequency and intensity of mental imagery varies greatly from one person to another. Some people report that their mental lives are replete with imagery as vivid and detailed as the actual scenes they recall. For others, imagery is uniformly vague, dim, and fleeting. And, for a final group, there seems to be no imagery at all. For them, talk of mental imagery is empty, to the extent that Galton 58 compared them to the color-blind who are unable to comprehend color terms. It would be interesting to see whether analogous arguments suggest that remembering-how is just another form of remembering-that.

    The criterion for identifying propositional memory is a grammatical one: the memory content must have the form of a tensed that-complement clause. The criterion for identifying experien- tial memory is, on the one hand, a phenomenological one—they present themselves to the mind as images and qualitative experiences—and, on the other, a metaphysical one—they refer to events that one has personally experienced.

    I remember having spent a few days in Rome , others by a that-clause e. I remember that I spent a few days in Rome , and again others by some other construction. Since experiential memory cannot be defined by the kind of complement phrase used to express it, there is no clear correlation between the grammatical form of a memory report and the kind of memory expressed. And although the three forms are each associated with a particular grammatical construction—remembering that such-and- such, remembering how to do such-and-such, remembering such-and-such itself —grammar provides only a rough guide to which form of memory is involved.

    Something is known by acquaintance when there is direct experience of it; it is known by description if it can only be described as a thing with such-and-such properties. Experiential memory is said to be memory by acquaintance and its intentional objects are not facts or propositions but people, places, things, events, and situations. Propositional memory, on the other hand, is thought to be analogous to knowledge by description. For a survey of recent literature on the range of imaging see Schwitzgebel First, many auto- biographical data are remembered by description and many memories of impersonal propositions are due to us having been acquainted with the things they are about.

    Second, in one respect propositional memory is analogous to knowledge by acquaintance. Russell himself thought that in entertaining a proposition, one is acquainted with that propo- sition. Malcolm, a proponent of the tripartite taxonomy of kinds of memory, bites the bullet. This position, I reckon, is too implausible to be acceptable. An advocate of the distinction between memory by acquaintance and memory by description might respond to the third objection as follows: Even though we cannot experientially remember that p solely by getting acquainted with a relevant experience, we can remember that p by having a relevant experience as an intermediate step.

    We are fooled into thinking that we can remember that p experientially because there is an indirect connection between our memory that p and our acquaintance with the relevant experience.

    [Review of:] Memory, A Philosophical Study / by Sven Bernecker

    Tyler Burge n. However, we saw that what distinguishes experiential from propositional memory is that the former, but not the latter, is limited to items with which one has had direct acquaintance. The distinction between semantic and episodic memory, however, does not turn on direct acquaintance with the remembered thing but instead on the contextual wealth of the stored information. It would therefore be desirable to establish an alternative taxonomy of kinds of memory. Given this approach, there are four main kinds of remembering.

    One can remember persons and things e. S remembers the Colosseum , properties e. S remembers the elliptical shape of the Colosseum , events e. Consequently, I will speak of object, property, event, and propositional memory. Object, property, and event memory may collectively be labeled non-propositional memory.

    What propositional memory one is capable of attaining is dependent on what concepts one possesses. My reductionist position regarding memory-wh is compatible both with reductionism about knowledge-wh Higginbotham and with anti-reductionism about knowledge-wh Schaffer Yet given the grammatical taxonomy of memory proposed here, phenomenological aspects are irrelevant for determining what kind of memory a mental episode belongs to.

    It goes without saying that by proposing a grammatical criterion for the classification of kinds of memory I do not wish to deny that non-language-users or at least those with a central nervous system can remember things, and that human remembering is only a special case of the general multi-systemed phenomenon of remembering. A dog may indicate in his behavior that he remembers where his food is kept. Beyond remembering an object, property, event, or fact we can remember how to do something. According to Bach, that-clauses do not univocally denote propositions.

    Granted that facts are truth-makers of propositions, it may be argued that one can remember the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar without possessing the concepts Brutus, Caesar, and to stab. Yet in this study I will prescind from practical memory. Instead the focus will be squarely on propositional memory. A non-propositional representation can be remembered in proposi- tional format and a propositional representation can be remembered in non-propositional format.

    Jennifer Lackey describes a case that might be interpreted as involving a propositional memory of a past non-propositional representation. S drives to work along a highway and pays attention only to the other cars on the road and the radio program. Later someone asks S if there is construction on another highway that S passes on his way to work. S is able to call to mind passing the highway and correctly remembers seeing construction work being done on the highway in question.

    To cut the topic of this study to a manageable size, I will concentrate on propositional memories that are memory- related to past episodes of propositional awareness; the only exception is section 3. The propositions that are the object of memory can be of two different kinds. When I remember that Brutus stabbed Caesar, the content of the memory state reproduces the content of a past mental state of mine. Yet when I remember that I believed that Brutus stabbed Caesar, the memory content represents not only the content of the past mental state but also the psychological attitude I had toward that content.

    This memory content has the form of a meta-representation—it represents the past mental state as a representation. Extroversive memory is a kind of delayed perception while introversive memory is a kind of delayed self-knowledge.

    Finding the target: what type of “identity” are we seeking?

    A case in point is doubt. Suppose I remember having doubted that Brutus stabbed Caesar. The same is true of the propositional attitude of regretting. Moreover, conative states can be recalled only by means of introversive memory, for I cannot remem- ber the content of my conative states without remembering their attitudes. Although the distinction between extroversive and introversive mem- ory is grounded on a difference in the way we express what we remember, there are instances where memory reports are not reliable indicators of which camp a given state belongs to.

    Occasionally extroversive memories are phrased as introversive memories. Just as there are instances where extroversive memo- ries are phrased as introversive memories, there might be instances where introversive memories are phrased as extroversive memories. Moreover, memory reports are sometimes not reliable indicators of whether a given state is a propositional or a non-propositional memory.

    In this section I attempt further to explicate my taxonomy of kinds of memory by relating it to these distinctions. Yet it may seem to you as if you remember that Brutus stabbed Caesar and you can remember it seeming to you that Brutus stabbed Caesar. There will be more verdicality constraint on pages 36—9 and in section 8.

    I remember what I had for breakfast or I remember what is my favorite book by Caesar. A memory content in the first-person mode is false when the bearer of the content is not the same person as the one referred to in the memory content. Problems arise when the grammatical object of memory is a quantifier. Does remembering no one imply that no one was there? Suppose that the person currently occupying my body is different from the person who occupied it this morning. Due to the change of personal identity, I would say something false if I claimed to remember what I had for breakfast first-person mode.

    But I would still speak the truth if I claimed to remember that someone or other had cereal for breakfast third-person mode. I will be concerned with both modes of extroversive memory contents. There will be more on the relation between personal identity and memory on pages 41—2 and in Chapter 2. Inferential memory is memory based on inferential reasoning. Inferential reasoning is conscious or subconscious reasoning that is based on additional premisses that are evidence for its conclusion, that entail its conclusion, or that make its conclusion plausible.

    In this study I will focus, for the most part, on non-inferential memory. In an example that Malcolm gives of inferential memory, S observes a certain blue bird. Later S learns that such birds are blue jays cyanocitta cristata. Still later S claims to remember that he saw a blue jay. However, S does not really remember that he saw a blue jay. So S knows that he saw a blue jay, via inference from the claim that such a blue bird as he saw is a blue jay.

    A terminological note. Specifications of the content of a propositional attitude state must not employ concepts that are not possessed by the subject. Some philosophers stipulate that there is a kind of content which is not a reflection of the concepts possessed by the subject. S plays a game with dice, one of which is 8-sided and one of which is sided. At the time S lacks the concept of a dodecahedron and of a octahedral. He treats all dice with more than six sides as the same.

    Later on, after having acquired the concept of a dodecahedron, S recalls his experience playing the game and is able to come to believe, on the basis of memory alone, that one of the dice was a dodecahedron. From this Martin draws two inferences. First, if S can infer a belief involving the concept dodecahedron from remembering his past perceptual experience, then dodecahedron must have been part of the content of his past perceptual experience.

    Given my focus on propositional memory, I will be concerned with conceptual memory content. Even when I examine non-propositional memory I will concentrate on states with conceptual content. The substitution of co-referring terms or phrases in de dicto memory attributions could potentially alter their truth value. Since propositional memory attributions are usually taken to be referentially opaque and since I focus on propositional memory, I will adopt the de dicto reading of memory attributions. According to the dispositional usage, we can say of someone that he remembers that p even while he is sound asleep.

    A dispositional claim is a claim, not about anything that is actually occurring at the time, but rather that some particular thing is prone to occur, under certain circumstances. Occurrent memories come and go, depending on the presence of appropriate retrieval cues; dispositional memories endure. Oc- current memories are those that we are conscious of having now—even though we may not be conscious of our occurrent memories as memories. Dispositional memories, however, need not be currently entertained for their ascription to be true.

    What we are conscious of are not dispositional memories but the memory episodes they give rise to. A memory is subconscious at a given time if it is not being entertained by the agent at that time, but, given the appropriate retrieval cues, he would entertain it.

    An unconscious memory is one that is in principle beyond the reach of conscious awareness because it is repressed. Sigmund Freud suggested that certain types of events, extremely painful or horrible or traumatic ones, are repressed because they cannot be tolerated by the subject. Repressed information, though inaccessible to introspection, may, according to Freud, manifest itself as inadverted slips of tongue or pen, in which the speaker or writer makes an error that is said to reflect his underlying feelings rather than the intended meaning.

    Repressed information is also said to disrupt ongoing behavior in the form of neurotic symptoms and find expressions in dreams. Given my focus on occurrent memories, I concentrate on conscious memory. And insofar as I examine dispositional memory it is the subconscious rather than the unconscious variety that will be dealt with. Bonanno ; Hayne, Garry, and Loftus A pretty convincing laboratory analogue of repression was produced by Glucksberg and King Their study relied on the use of remote word associations.

    Glucksberg and King taught their subjects a list of nonsense syllable-word pairs e. Then the subjects were shown a list of words comprising the remote associates of the words learned, and some of these were accompanied by an electric shock. When the retention of the initial pairs was tested, there was a tendency for subjects to show poorer retention of words whose remote associates had been linked with shock.

    None of the subjects was able to verbalize the relation between the shocked words and the initial learning, although all of them were able to recognize which words had been accompanied by an electric shock. But if memories are representational items in the brain or, metaphorically speaking, sentence tokens in the memory box , it would seem that on this interpretation we suffer from an embarrassment of riches, namely, that each individual has far too many memories for all of them to be explicitly represented in the brain. It would be a violation of the principle of clutter avoidance if all these memories were explicitly represented.

    In response to this problem, some philosophers distinguish between explicit and implicit or tacit memory. To implicitly remember that p your mind may not contain a representation with that content. Although at any given moment we have only a finite number of explicit memories, we implicitly remember countless things. First, there are simple-consequence accounts according to which to implicitly remember that p is to have an explicit memory from which p swiftly and obviously follows Dennett 39— That is an example in which the implicit memory is entailed by the explicit memory.

    In the psychological sense, explicit memory involves the conscious recollection of previously presented information, while implicit memory involves the facilitation of a task, or a change in performance as a result of previous exposure to information, without, or at least not as a result of, conscious recollection. For example, if a subject memorizes a list of word pairs e. Schacter A piece of memory that is implicit in the psychological sense may nevertheless be stored explicitly in the philosophical sense. My notions of object, property, event, and fact memory belong to the category of explicit long-term memory.

    Second, there is the formation-dispositional account, which explains instances of implicit memory by way of hypothetical explicit memories. To implicitly remember that p is to be disposed to have an explicit memory of it in such-and-such circumstances De Sousa ; Lycan 54—71; Sellars As it stands, this characterization of implicit memory is insufficient. Counterexamples suggest that to implicitly remember that p requires more than merely being disposed to explicitly remember that p, and less than representing p internally. Two strategies have been considered for supplementing the initial account.

    The first strategy requires the disposition to have an explicit memory be grounded in an extrapolator-deducer mechanism i. Any merely implicit memory is merely dispositional. Yet explicit memories are not necessarily occurrent, for only some explicit memories are currently operative at any given time.

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    Thus the distinction between implicit and explicit memories is not the same as that between occurrent and dispositional memories. In this study I will focus on explicit memory. In sum, this investigation is primarily concerned with episodes of conscious, explicit, veridical, non-inferential, de dicto, propositional memory that are memory-related to past episodes of propositional representation. There seem to be mainly three reasons for this. First, given that conceptual analysis is supposed to yield necessary and sufficient conditions, very few, if any, successful analyses have been produced—analyses, that is, of philosophically interesting concepts.

    The bulk of those produced have nearly always been undermined by convincing hypothetical situations that indicate that the analysandum does not mean the same thing as the analysans. Quine Third, assuming that the relation between the analysandum and the analysans is knowable a priori, the knowledge we gain through conceptual analysis is a priori knowledge—a type of knowledge many philosophers are suspicious of.

    One of the reasons philosophers are suspicious of a priori knowledge is because they think it is incompatible with philosophical naturalism, that is, the view that the methods of justification and explanation used in philosophy must be commensurable with those in the natural sciences.

    I intend to expose at best only necessary conditions for remembering. It can bring out the content or the structure of the concept in such a way as to clarify the concept and indicate its relation to some other concepts representing its constituents. The conditions for remembering I will expose are at best necessary conditions. Section 2. That memory presupposes personal identity is a contingent fact having to do with the kind of world we inhabit.

    What about the third objection? As will be explained in Chapter 6, I am committed to content externalism or anti-individualism. Content externalism has it that one can have a particular concept without knowing any of its essential properties. There is a crucial difference between the possession of a concept and knowing the conditions that may be regarded as necessary to, and jointly sufficient for, the application of the concept. According to content externalism, the contents of our thoughts and the meanings of our concepts depend on relations that we bear to our physical and social environment.

    Since knowledge of the referents is typically empirical, it follows that a conceptual analysis may involve empirical investigations. The linguistic intuitions that guide conceptual analysis are not a priori but empirical working hypotheses cf. Kornblith When one examines what it takes for someone to remember some- thing, one must do so from some point of view. One can work from the point of view of the subject, taking into account only that which is available to the subject at the given time, or one can work from the point of view of someone who knows all the relevant facts, some of which might not be available to the subject.

    My approach is externalist. It is important not to confuse methodological externalism with content externalism. Internalism about justification is the view that all the factors required for a belief to be justified must be cognitively accessible to the subject and thus internal to his mind. A belief is justified if it has the property of being truth-effective. The property of being truth-effective may, for example, consist in the belief being produced by a reliable method or process. No more than this is necessary for justification.

    Some types of mental states are transparent to their subject in the sense that he can identify them and discriminate them from one another in any possible situation.

    What happens when you remove the hippocampus? - Sam Kean

    Bodily sensations, for example, are commonly regarded as transparent. I can always identify intense pain and can tell it apart from mildly pleasurable sensations. Factive mental states, however, are not transparent. A case in point is knowledge. Knowledge is not transparent because the agent cannot discriminate true from false belief just on the basis of reflection. Similarly, whether I see something or whether it only seems to me that I see it is not something I can know by reflection. Are memories transparent from the first-person perspective?

    To remember is to undergo a certain sort of mental experience. It is to experience a mental representation—usually called a memory image —which reproduces some past sense experience. The memory image provides us with the information we are then said to remember. It is a distinctive feature of representative realism that remembering involves primary awareness of memory images.

    The need to discern memory data from other kinds of expe- riences is particularly pressing if one wants to base memory knowledge on awareness of memory experiences. Representative realists maintain that one can tell, by reflection alone, whether a particular image one is having is one of memory, or one of the other faculties of the mind, such as perception or imagination. They maintain that there is a feature of memory data that stamps them as such.

    This feature of memory data is commonly referred to as the memory marker. Memory markers are a priori knowable properties of memory data by which they can be distinguished from other mental phenomena. Memory markers have been described by representative realists in a number of ways, as the feeling of warmth and intimacy James i.

    There are cases in which these alleged memory markers are present, but in which there is no inclination to speak of memory and there are instances where memories lack these alleged markers. We may seem to remember something that is really unfamiliar to us, and we may not seem to remember something that once formed part of our common experience. The association between images that strike us as familiar and memory is not an epistemic reason for anything.

    For the mere fact, if it is one, that we are inclined to make this association does not imply that we are entitled to make it. To be so entitled, we would need independent evidence suggesting that genuine memories appear familiar more often than fantasies. If such evidence exists at all, it cannot be accessed by reflection alone. Whether I genuinely remember p or whether it only seems to me that I remember p I cannot tell just by reflection. Memory must be analyzed from a third-person point of view.

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    The conditions for remembering may not be identified with the conditions for saying that one remembers. The externalist approach to the study of memory is in line with my disregard for phenomenological grounds for distinguishing types of memories. The grammatical taxonomy of kinds of memory, proposed in the previous section, allows for the analysis of memory to be conducted from a third-person rather than a first-person perspective. In the remainder of this chapter I will set forth preliminary analyses of four kinds of propositional memory: extroversive memory in the first-person mode and in the third-person mode as well as introversive memory about factive attitudes and about non-factive attitudes.

    The motive behind developing these tentative analyses is to identify the issues in the philosophy of memory that require and merit in-depth investigation. The five conditions may be labeled, respectively, the present representation condition 1 , the past representation condition 2 , the truth-condition 3 , the content condition 4 , and the connection condition 5.

    Those who have read the introductory chapter p. This is the motivation for the past and present representation condition. Sometimes the occurrent cognitive state in fact-remembering is one of belief or knowledge, but it need not always be; or so Chapter 3 argues. You may have believed that p in the past and remember that p today, even though someone has in the meantime convinced you that p is false.

    And just as the present cognitive state need not be one of belief or knowledge nor does the past cognitive state. Though the attitude of a memory state need not be one of believing or knowing, not any kind of cognitive attitude that stands in a memory- relation to another cognitive attitude qualifies as a memory state. Only cognitive attitudes with a mind-to-world or thetic direction of fit can qualify as memory states. Section 8. Tokens of non-propositional awareness are remembered frequently in propositional format. Suppose that, as a small child I saw a picture of Caesar wearing a laurel wreath.

    I may remember this episode of non-propositional awareness by forming the belief that Caesar wore a laurel wreath. The way conditions 1 and 2 are phrased makes it clear that this study concentrates on propositional memories that are memory-related to past episodes of propositional awareness. If not-p, then S may think he remembers that p, but cannot actually remember that p.

    And it is not only propositional memory that implies truth. Non-propositional memory is also factive. But since we obviously do remember things that are false, it seems that memory cannot be factive. This objection to the truth-condition is mistaken. Though memory entails truth, we can be mistaken in thinking that we remember something. The truth-condition of memory can be motivated in two ways.

    Just as G. When I claim to remember that p, I am convinced that p is the case. This is what the first part of the statement expresses. Yet the second part of the statement denies that p is the case. Instead it can be incoherent because one cannot claim to remember that p while claiming that p is false. A better argument for the factivity of memory is based on syntax. Factive verbs are members of a class of expressions with certain syntactic features in common cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky Both factive and non- factive propositional verbs can take that-clause complements e.

    The former interpretation of the factivity of memory is adopted by most philosophers and is widespread among psychologists. For instance, Asher Koriat and Morris Goldsmith declare: In perception, interest lies in the correspondence between what we perceive and what is out there, that is, in the output-bound veridicality of our perceptions, and in the various ways in which they may deviate from reality e. Likewise, under the correspondence metaphor, memory may be conceived as the perception of the past, and the question then becomes to what extent this perception is dependable.

    Ian Newby and Michael Ross , on the other hand, conceive of the direction of fit of memory as mind-in-the-present-to-mind-in-the-past, and of the accuracy of memory as the degree of correspondence between the mind at two different times. He imagines that he teaches a child the false statement that Columbus discovered America in He remembers what I told him. That Columbus discovered America in Odell concludes that this shows that one can remember that p even when p is false. The correspondence metaphor of memory takes the form of representation and the form of resemblance.

    For this reason there needs to be a content condition 4 and past representation condition 2 in addition to the truth-condition 3.